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SOME REFLECTIONS ON MULTICULTURALISM, "EQUAL
CONCERN AND RESPECT," AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
Sanford Levinson**
I. SOME INTRODUCTORY AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I was born and grew up in Hendersonville, North Carolina, a
small town of about 6000 people in the western part of the
state. There were about 30 Jewish families in Hendersonville,
and I knew from a very early age that I was Jewish and, con-
sequently, that I was different in an important way from al-
most all of my neighbors and classmates. The most evident
way, especially to a child, involved dietary prohibitions against
eating pork. I also knew that I was allowed absences from
school (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur) while other children
were not. Inevitably, my Jewishness accounts for many of the
* For reasons that will become obvious in the course of this article, I wish to
dedicate it to Michael McConnell and Gary Leedes, two outstanding legal academics
who are unafraid to acknowledge the role that religion plays in their lives. I also
want to thank both Professor Leedes for his kindness in helping to make possible my
visit to the University of Richmond Law School in March-April 1993 as an occupant
of the Allen Chair and participant in the Allen seminar and the entire faculty of the
law school for helping to make my visit so enjoyable. Finally, I thank the Allen
family for their imagination in endowing the seminar that bears their name.
I also want to thank Doug Laycock, Cynthia Levinson, Michael McConnell, Scot
Powe, and James Boyd White for their responses to earlier drafts of this essay. I also
appreciate the thoughtful responses of the students in the legal scholarship seminar
conducted by Richard Pildes and Deborah Livingston at the University of Michigan
Law School, to which I presented an earlier version of this article in October 1993. It
is also worth noting that I finished the basic draft of this article before the
publication of two important books that are directly relevant to it, STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AiMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) and STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S
CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR
CLASSROOMS (1993). I will be reviewing both books in the 1994 book review
symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School.
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memories-most of them, it is important to say at the outset,
quite pleasant-I have of growing up in Hendersonville, and I
begin this essay with two of them.
A. Thesis: Learning Bible and Singing Carols
As a third-grader, I won a "Bible certificate" from the State
of North Carolina for memorizing a number of Bible verses,
including John 3:16, which I can summon up in my mind to
this very day: "For God so loved the world that he sent his only
begotten Son, and whosoever believeth in him shall be guaran-
teed everlasting life."' From the vantage point of almost 45
years later, I think that I recall finding, as a Jewish youngster,
something at least odd, if not objectionable, about saying the
verse aloud in front of my class (which is how we got credit for
memorizing the verse of the week). After all, most Jewish chil-
dren, at least in the United States, are initially taught about
Judaism in terms of what it is not, i.e., Christianity. However
difficult it may be to determine the theological tenets of tradi-
tional Judaism, it is clear that none of them recognizes Jesus
as divine or as the carrier of salvation.2 Although I can not be
sure, I strongly suspect that I already knew by the third grade
that, at least so far as Jews are concerned, what John was
stating I could not affirm as the truth even as I proclaimed it
aloud. But the challenge of winning the certificate (and, I sus-
pect in retrospect, of proving myself not so different from my
Biblically-proficient classmates) prevailed over any other consid-
erations that might have come to my very young mind.
1. I have purposely left in the text what I remembered the text saying prior to
"looking it up." One "official" version is "For God so loved the world that he gave his
only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life." John
3:16 (Revised Standard Version). It is this version that is quoted in Michael McCon-
nell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 215 n.136 (1992) (quoting H. RICHARD
NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CuLTuRE 197 (1951)).
2. It is important to recognize, though, the existence of self-described "Jews for
Jesus," or "completed Jews," who proclaim the co-existence of Jewish identity and
acceptance of Jesus as their Lord and Savior. Their claims, however, have not been
accepted by anyone within the "mainstream" Jewish community. See Sanford Levin-
son, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional
Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1585 n.20 (1993).
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Far more vivid in my memory are my reactions to marching
each December with other public-school students to the First
Methodist Church for our annual concert of Christmas carols
(which, needless to say, we had rehearsed at school). This pro-
voked a sharper conflict in regard to my own sense of Jewish
identity; though once again, I did little to set myself apart from
the hegemonic majority. In retrospect, I have no idea if the
concert was "compulsory." I doubt that it was; had I, or my
parents, insisted on non-participation, I am quite sure that
would have been acceptable. The community as a whole was
quite tolerant, in its own way. Jews were well integrated into
the fabric of community life and were often called on to explain
Passover and other Jewish holidays. So why did I march? One
answer is that, if truth be known, I rather enjoyed (and enjoy
to this day) the tunes of most of the various carols.
Still, I recall feeling certain tensions about some of the lyrics
we were called upon to sing. My personal resolution of any
such tensions that I felt was simply to avoid singing those lines
that included reference to Jesus or, even more to the point,
"Christ our Lord." Thus I joined happily in calling on all of the
faithful, joyful and triumphant to come to Bethlehem to adore
an unnamed "him." I maintained a stony silence, however, at
the last line, which seemed to suggest that I did indeed recog-
nize "him" as "Christ our Lord." Similarly, I always enjoyed the
lovely Moravian hymn, "I Wonder as I Wander," but I never
joined in the words "Jesus our Savior." Again, as with John
3:16, I recall most of the words of most of the standard Christ-
mas carols to this day.
I also believe that the elementary school day began with the
Lord's Prayer. I know its text, and I remember saying it re-
peatedly while I was growing up. I cannot imagine where I
might have learned or recited it other than the public schools.
None of its overt language, of course, is offensive to a
Jew-how could it be, given Jesus' own status as a Jew-and I
recall little hesitation in joining in.
Later, at Hendersonville High School, I had the opportunity
to take an elective course in Bible. The class was taught, I
believe, by volunteers supplied by local churches. It was, most
definitely, not a course on the Bible in Western literature or
9911993]
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the like. I did not enroll in that course. Instead, I happily took
typing; perhaps the most useful course I ever had in high
school. I am not aware that any Jewish student ever took the
Bible course, though the low number of such students-I was
one of two in my class of 70-limits the force of any generaliza-
tion on this point.
As I got further along in school, I did begin to wonder about
the legitimacy of all of this interaction between school and
church. Certainly by the time I graduated from college (I at-
tended Duke, a Methodist school that required two semesters of
religion courses in order to graduate) I had come to the firm
opinion that North Carolina had behaved not simply question-
ably, but unconstitutionally. I had discovered the First Amend-
ment in political science courses and, more to the point, the
"separationist" perspective identified especially with Hugo
Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson.3 I am quite con-
fident that I agreed with the latter two justices that even the
limited state aid accepted by Black in Everson v. New Jersey4
was constitutionally illegitimate. There should indeed be a "wall
of separation" between church and state that would basically
cordon off the institutions of the latter from any real contact
with, or encouragement of, the former. When, in my senior year
of college (1962), school prayer was found constitutionally ille-
gitimate by the Supreme Court,5 I rejoiced. I can recall quite
vividly the fantasy of becoming a lawyer, returning to Hender-
sonville, and using my skills as a constitutional lawyer to elimi-
nate any reference to God from the school day.
B. Antithesis: Religious Pluralism in Hendersonville
There are, however, other memories of religion connected
with the important aspects of my growing up in Hendersonville.
3. See especially the opinions of these justices in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1947) (invalidating in-school "released time" pro-
grams).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding the provision of bus service for parochial school
students).
5. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
347 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Some of them have to do with the local synagogue. The syna-
gogue was too small to afford a rabbi, which meant that servic-
es were conducted by the lay members of the community (in-
cluding myself). I have little doubt that this emphasis on lay
participation was extraordinarily important in developing some
of my views about the dispensability of certain hierarchical
roles, including "supreme" courts, that we too often take for
granted.'
In relation to this particular essay, however, the most impor-
tant memories, and certainly among my fondest, involve what
through the haze of years appear to have been "endless" discus-
sions with a group of friends about religion. A fairly typical
evening, especially in summers, would be to drink beer or play
poker while at the same time energetically debate the basic
questions of religion, especially those involving theodicy and the
presence of an afterlife. Though, as children of the 1950s, we
were thoroughly segregated racially,-I did not have non-white
classmates until I went to graduate school at Harvard in
1962,-we were otherwise wonderfully pluralistic. My friends
included a Catholic (a Massachusetts native whose father had
come South when General Electric moved one of its plants to
Hendersonville), several Southern Baptists, a Methodist, a Pres-
byterian, and myself. We argued with the particular intensity of
teenagers, though never, so far as I recall, acrimoniously. (The
parents of the two Southern Baptists, however, did express con-
cern to their sons about the heretical views to which they were
being exposed.)
I particularly remember my Southern Baptist friends express-
ing seemingly genuine regret that my failure to acknowledge
Jesus as my Savior condemned me to eternal torment in hell.
They would have preferred knowing that I would join them in
heaven. This was said by them, and perceived by me, without
the slightest personal hostility. My non-saved fate was, from
their perspective, simply a statement of theological fact, and
their attempt to save me from what was quite literally a fate
worse than death was, consequently, an act of friendship. Imag-
ine, for example, a friend observing someone close to him or her
6. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH ch. 1 (1988).
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driving while intoxicated. Surely we would not expect the friend
to remain silent and accept as dispositive, following a fatal
accident, the statement: "Well, it was her life, and friends don't
interfere with one another." Friends ought to warn one another
about perceived dangers facing them.
My Baptist friends were engaged in an act of such warning,
even though I chose to ignore it. I do not censure them for
their concern, especially given their general courtesy and will-
ingness to tolerate my response to their entreaties that, as a
Jew, I just did not see any reason to accept Jesus as divine,
though I always took care to describe him as a great man emi-
nently worth respecting even if not worshipping. Moreover, I
added that I did not believe that a God worth worshipping (or
even respecting) would condemn anyone to the torments of
eternal punishment. My Christian friends were scarcely mono-
lithic on any of these points, and, among other things, I got to
know the differences among Christian denominations.
In looking back and trying to determine, for better or worse,
what might help to account for the development of my particu-
lar persona, I often think of those friends and of our discus-
sions. I am convinced that they had far more to do with my
becoming an academic intellectual than anything that took
place during the generally dreary school days, during which my
primary achievement was getting so many C's in "cooperation"
that I was ineligible for the National Honor Society. It was
with John, Jim, Benny Cole, and Gar that I became comfortable
exploring some basic issues of life. I remain forever grateful to
them.
In many ways the rest of this article is an exploration of
whether it is possible to synthesize these two sets of memories,
not simply in accounting for autobiographical development, but,
far more importantly, in terms of general social and legal
analysis. My own life was immeasurably aided by friendships,
the result, with one exception, of mutual attendance at the
local public school with other youngsters who, from a variety of
perspectives, unabashedly took religious questions seriously.
Less happily, my life was also affected by state-encouraged
feelings of marginality and difference connected to such phe-
nomena as the Bible memorization and Christmas carols. Is
994 [Vol. 27:989
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there a way of putting together these memories-and, concomi-
tantly, engaging in cogent analysis of the issues raised by
them-in some way that makes sense?
II. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLURALISM AND SEPARATISM
What I have celebrated, in the second set of memories, is the
actuality of a certain model of pluralism; the ability of persons
from a variety of sub-cultures to come together and encounter
one another without negating those aspects that indeed make
them different from each another. To use a term that was bles-
sedly absent from the language of my youth, a kind of multi-
culturalism was present in Hendersonville, with enormous bene-
fit. "Multiculturalism" is well defined by Robert Hughes as:
[The] assert[ion] that people with different roots can co-
exist, that they can learn to read the image banks of oth-
ers, that they can and should look across the frontiers of
race, language, gender and age [and, presumably, religion]
without prejudice or illusion, and learn to think against the
background of a hybridized society.'
Whatever the obvious limits of my small North Carolina
town's multiculturalism-the most notable certainly was racial
segregation that deprived me of any real contact with African-
American students-it was also a powerful reality in at least
the dimension of religion, with enduring importance for my life.
And what allowed these encounters across culture to take place
was, in substantial part, the fact that most of us attended the
same public school. (There was a Catholic elementary school,
however, and some Catholic students attended a Catholic school
in Asheville, 20 miles away. There was also a private boys'
school, but very few local students attended it.)
It is also worth saying that I hope my friends believed (and
believe now in retrospect) that they benefitted from having a
Jewish friend. We too often automatically sneer at the phrase
"some of my best friends are Jewish (or any other religion or
7. ROBERT HUGHES, THE CULTURE OF COMPLAINT 83-84 (1993).
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race)," but surely it would be a profound social good if all of us
could in fact say, with conviction, that some of our best friends
are from groups other than those with which we most centrally
identify. No heterogeneous society can long survive if it becomes
truly exceptional to develop the particular intimacies of friend-
ship with anyone other than those who are exactly like oneself.
I know that I think differently, and better, of Southern Baptists
because some of my best childhood friends were members of
that denomination. I would hope that the same is true for them
in regard to Jews.
I also know that my life in the elite legal academy has been
basically devoid of contact with committed Christians, especially
evangelical Protestants. One can count literally on the fingers
of one hand the number of publicly visible Protestant evangeli-
cals who hold tenured positions at America's "leading" law
schools. In this respect (and, undoubtedly, many others), no
elite law school even remotely "looks like America," at least if
that is meant to suggest that members of the various sub-cul-
tures of American society should actively participate in each of
the institutional structures that comprise that society. And, as I
have written elsewhere, it is noteworthy "that almost none of
the contemporary demands for greater diversity of voices within
the academy include a call for a greater presence of the almost
totally absent sound of a strong religious sensibility."'
It should be clear that the creation of a public school system
that truly brings together, in a context of mutual respect and
concern, persons of different backgrounds is a high social good.
Concomitantly, the adoption of policies that discourage such
multicultural encounters and, instead, lead to withdrawal into
separate enclaves of homogeneity is, if not an unequivocal social
bad, then at least something that should scarcely be applauded
without grave reservations. It is in thinking about public
schools that we most directly confront the questions of social
reproduction and the inculcation of values that constitute us as
a distinctive social order. As the Supreme Court once put it,
quoting two historians: "The role and purpose of the American
8. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2061, 2062 n.7 (1992) (book review).
[Vol. 27:989996
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public school system [is to] 'prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic."'9 This, one hopes, includes development of a stance
of "tolerance of divergent political and religious views" and the
taking into account "of the sensibilities of others."' My very
citation of the Court's opinion in Bethel signifies the fact that
in the United States, for better and worse, the kinds of ques-
tions I am raising are not merely ones of "social policy" or even
political theory. Instead, what Justice Cardozo once called "It]he
great generalities of the constitution"1 are thought to speak
with sometimes surprising specificity, let the consequences be
what they may. Two strands of cases are particularly important
in the context of my reminiscences and subsequent reflections.
The first involves the constitutionality of state aid to religious
schools. The second deals with what might be termed the secu-
larization of the public school system and consequent withdraw-
al of at least some Christians (and, no doubt, other sectarians
as well, including Orthodox Jews) from the public schools.
There are many fine articles detailing the specific doctrinal
twists and turns within these areas,' and this essay is not
intended to compete with any of them. Instead, I want to offer
some modest reflections about the interplay between current
doctrinal developments and the achievement of a multicultural
society whose members are nonetheless bonded by mutual re-
spect and, if this is not too completely utopian, affection.
9. Bethel Sch. Dis. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD
& M. BEARD, Now BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
10. Id.
11. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921).
12. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1;
Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.
REV. 409 (1986); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COL. L.
REV. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989); William P. Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
495 (1986); Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CII. L.
REV. 115 (1992), reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 115
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); Suzanna Sherry, Lee V. Weisman: Paradox
Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123. David C. Williams and Susan H. Williams,
Volitionalism- and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991). This is, of
course, only the tip of the scholarly iceberg, and omission from the list should not be
taken as denigrating the undoubted importance of many uncited articles.
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A. Aid to Parochial Schools
As already suggested, I initially had little trouble supporting
the stance of "hard-core separationists" that public monies
should be used little, if at all, to "support" or "subsidize" reli-
gion. People certainly had a right to be religious, but let them
do so on their own time and spending their own money. They
were just as certainly not entitled to even a penny of my taxes
to spend in ways that furthered their religious aims. The key
word in this sentence is "furthered," since, as economists teach,
state provision of any goods, including police and fire protec-
tion, frees up funds that can now be used for other purposes,
including religious indoctrination.
Few persons, though, are so relentlessly anti-clerical as to
deny police and fire protection to a church. In any event, these
issues were not to be settled through ordinary political debate
and votes. Instead, I believed that the Court should militantly
use the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as a
sword against any legislative decisions to expend public monies
in ways that aided religious schools. 3 "[Tiaxpayers have a
right," enforceable by the courts, "not to subsidize religion."'4
Religious parents do apparently have a constitutional right,
thanks to the 1925 case Pierce v. Society of Sisters," to with-
draw their children from public schools and educate them pri-
vately. They should not, however, expect public aid in financing
this private education. Indeed, they should realize that it is
illegitimate even to ask for such aid.
13. For a forthright presentation of this view, see Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 196 (Geoffrey R.
Stone et al. eds., 1992).
14. Id. at 211.
15. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
998 [Vol. 27:989
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I have been persuaded 6 by Michael McConnell, 7 however,
that this interpretation of the Constitution is profoundly
wrong,'8 especially if one believes that the principle of "equal
concern and respect" is a foundational predicate of our constitu-
tional order.19 The key here is the attitude one adopts with
regard to Pierce. On one hand, Pierce's support of a constitu-
tional right to opt out of public education could be viewed sim-
ply as the unfortunate positive law of our Constitution, to be
submitted to so long as it is not formally repealed or overruled,
but not to be admired. Conversely, Pierce could be read as a
constitutional principle which should be supported and perhaps
even venerated. Mark Yudof, for example, interprets Pierce as
standing for the proposition that governments, while "free to
establish their own public schools and to make education com-
pulsory for certain age groups," 20 cannot use state power "to
eliminate competing, private-sector educational institutions that
may serve to create heterogeneity and to counter the state's
dominance over the education of the young."2 '
From this perspective, Pierce is a powerful barrier to totali-
tarianism through its recognition of the legitimacy of multi-
culturalism. The state is simply limited in its power to reinforce
the hegemony of the dominant culture by prohibiting parents
from engaging in at least partial "secession" from that culture
and instead carefully cultivating within their children alterna-
tive ways of looking at the world.22 Pierce seemingly calls for a
16. An earlier, far briefer version of this discussion can be found in my contribu-
tion to AMERICAN JEWS & THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH: THE NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION
IN PUBLIC LIFE 74-75 (David G. Dalin ed., 1993).
17. My colleague Douglas Laycock, who is unusual in his ability to take with ut-
most seriousness the claims of the religious without, so far as I know, being religious
himself, also provided a great deal of help.
18. For an especially brilliant article, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective
Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REv. 989 (1991).
19. The term "equal concern and respect" is probably most identified with Ronald
Dworkin. See e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-183 (1978). How-
ever, Dworkin builds on the earlier work of John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 511 (1971). The notion of "equal concern and respect" is also central to
the important theory of John Hart Ely. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRUST (1980).
20. MARK W. YUDOF, WHEN GOVEmiENT SPEAKS 229 (1983).
21. Id.
22. The "secession" image is developed by Professor Toni Marie Massaro in CON-
1993] 999
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measure of "equal concern and respect"2 for these alterna-
tives, especially if parents are willing to pay the costs of the
education at issue even as they pay taxes to support a public
school system which they reject.
One of the key questions raised by this last sentence is what
happens if parents are formally willing, but in fact basically
unable, to pay the costs of private education.' In other words,
should the putative benefits of private education, well articulat-
ed by Yudof, be limited only to the relatively affluent or to
those who receive voluntary contributions from people of greater
means? It is hard, at least for those of us who profess to be
egalitarian in our political sympathies, to figure out how the
answer to this question might be "yes."
McConnell, for example, makes very effective use of the point
that most contemporary liberals support state subsidy of abor-
tions for poor women on the ground that their formal right to
enjoy reproductive freedom, labeled "fundamental" by the
Court,25 is hollow if it is rationed by a price mechanism that
effectively denies indigent women access to abortions. If we
secular liberals are so solicitous about ensuring the practical
right of poor women to enjoy their right of reproductive choice,
why then are we not equally concerned, at least as a political
STITUTIONAL LITERACY: A CORE CURRICULUM FOR A MULTICULTURAL NATION 99-100
(1993). The "at least partial" in the text comes from the fact that not even Pierce
places absolute control in the hands of parents, for the state retains the right to
make sure that some "minimal" educational goods, as defined by the state, are trans-
mitted to children. See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW
43-77 (3d ed. 1992). Whether these requirements actually apply to home schooling, for
example, is doubtful, but as a formal question of constitutional power, there is little
doubt that courts will reject a claim of sovereign right by parents to disregard any
and all state commands with regard to the education of their children.
23. See DWORKIN supra note 19, at 180-83.
24. I put to one side the equally important question of whether it is legitimate to
make parents pay for both public education they do not use and for private schools
they patronize. My answer is that the general public benefits of (or, in the language
of economics, the "externalities" generated by) public education are sufficient to sup-
port coerced taxation for public education. I offer a similar analysis with regard to
taxing the childless, who make no direct use of public schools. The religious parent
sending children to non-public schools is no different, positionally, from the childless
person who is deprived of some important want because of the duty to pay education
taxes.
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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matter, about the equally constitutionally protected fundamen-
tal right of less affluent parents to choose religious education
for their children? Attempting to defend one's lack of equal con-
cern by reference to the Establishment Clause simply begs the
central issue of how in fact the clause should be interpreted.
McConnell argues, and I (now) agree, that arguments like
Professor Kathleen Sullivan's, with their blithe reference to
unacceptable "subsidies" of religious education, depend on a
baseline that in effect presumes the classically liberal "night-
watchman" state which leaves the provision of important servic-
es, including education, to the operation of the market. 26 It is
reference to this baseline that justifies the provision of publicly-
fimded police and fire protection to religious schools. It had
simply become an accepted practice even of a relatively minimal
state to provide such protection to the general public, and it
would have truly appeared (and would have been) discriminato-
ry had the state declared, in effect, that every building except
for churches would be protected against fire or theft. Concomi-
tantly, if the state had declared that it would provide some
special protection only for churches, then I, and I think most
analysts, would interpret this as clearly aiding religion in viola-
tion of any plausible interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Over the past half-century, the majority of the Supreme
Court has tended to interpret aid to parochial schools (in the
context of some general scheme of aid to private schools, for no
one has ever defended providing aid only to religious schools) as
in effect something very special; a deviation from a baseline of
no aid.
Education, however, has for at least 140 years, been an im-
portant aspect of governmental budgets, especially (and until
the 1960s, almost exclusively) at the local level. Even the clas-
sic Westerns featured the "school marm" whose state-funded
task was to maintain civilization on the frontier. Like fire and
police protection, education has been viewed as something the
26. See McConnell, supra note 12, at 184-85. McConnell's colleague, Cass Sunstein,
emphasizes the importance of baselines and their ostensible (and false) "neutrality" in
setting the terms of constitutional argument in CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSI-
TUTION (1993). See Sanford Levinson, Unnatural Law, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 19,
26, 1993, at 40 (reviewing Sunstein).
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state provides, even if from a contemporary perspective, much
of the past provision was minimal. In any event, as McConnell
notes, we have moved very far from the minimal state and
entered the world of the contemporary welfare state. That type
of state features extensive, and some would say, pervasive ex-
penditures by the state in order to provide goods and services
at less than market cost to those who could not otherwise af-
ford themY.2  The baseline is now that of the modern welfare
state, whose most substantial expenditures, particularly at the
state and local levels of government, are for educating the
young.
For McConnell, then, the contemporary situation is more akin
to the police and fire protection example. To offer extensive aid
only to those who will send their children to public schools or
to non-religiously affiliated private schools is, in effect, to exhib-
it a gross lack of equal concern and respect for the non-well-off
religious (and, of course, the non-well-off who desire private
education for other reasons as well). Moreover, there is the
reality that some parents cannot afford non-public education in
part because taxes for public education continue to mount.
The question then becomes whether legislatures can vote to
return some of this tax money through support for non-public
education, which would, as a practical matter, be used primari-
ly in religiously-based schools.28 I am no longer persuaded by
the argument that the Constitution deprives legislatures of the
freedom to exercise such judgment. Although I generally oppose,
and am often appalled by, the rightward drift of the Reagan-
Bush Supreme Court, I confess to a hope that the majority
would indeed reconsider what I now regard as one of the most
questionable legacies of the Warren Court era-the hostility to
aid to parochial schools.29
27. See McConnell, supra note 12.
28. A second important question, well beyond the scope of this informal essay, is
whether the state has not just permission, but a duty, to return such money. I am
decidedly more uncomfortable with this argument than with the more modest, though
scarcely less controversial, view that the Constitution, correctly interpreted, does not
deprive the state of the ability to aid private schools, including religious ones.
29. As I have said elsewhere, "I would . . . gladly overrule Committee for Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)," one of the most important barriers standing in the
way of state aid to religious schools. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the
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Although there are advances in this direction,3" it is note-
worthy that the majority has been remarkably cautious in re-
writing doctrine and, by and large, has been intensely fact-spe-
cific in upholding such aid. This was the case, for example, in
one of this past Term's cases dealing with religion, Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District.1 A five-justice majority,
through Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit holding that Arizona could not supply an
interpreter to a Catholic high school in order to facilitate the
attendance of James Zobrest, a deaf student who depended on
the use of sign language. No one could accuse Rehnquist of
cutting a wide swath, however. After first defining Arizona's
payment of the interpreter's salary as "part of a general govern-
ment program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child
qualifying as 'handicapped,"' 2 he went on to emphasize that
the Catholic school in question was "not relieved of an expense
that it otherwise would have assumed in educating its
students," since it presumably was not in the practice of provid-
ing interpreters to deaf students." Moreover, it was declared
significant that "the task of a sign-language interpreter seems
to us quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counsel-
or," for the interpreter ostensibly exercises no discretion in
communicating with his or her charge.34 "[E]thical guidelines,"
stated Rehnquist, "require interpreters to transmit everything
that is said in exactly the same way it was intended." 5 There
is, therefore, more than enough doctrinal "wiggle-room" in the
opinion to authorize the Court to strike down more expansive
aid to religious schools or to their students.
Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2061, 2078 n.72 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Wit-
ters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
31. 113 S. Ct. at 2462.
32. Id. at 2467.
33. Id. at 2469.
34. Id.
35. Id. Were this an essay on theories of interpretation and postmodernism, one
could certainly debate whether this guideline, in fact, is capable of being complied
with (and how one might conceivably know of this). Fortunately, this is not such an
essay, and I am assuming that most of us agree with Rehnquist that it is indeed
cogent to view the interpreter as being in a different position from the overtly choice-
making teacher.
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Given the extraordinarily limited reach of Rehnquist's opin-
ion, I was especially disappointed that Justices Blackmun and
Souter, two Justices I generally admire, dissented on the mer-
its. 6 They rejected the claim that Arizona should be able to
provide funds to Salpointe High School so that James Zobrest
could enjoy, as a practical matter, his constitutional right to
attend a religiously-based school. Instead, they accused the
majority of "authoriz[ing] a public employee to participate di-
rectly in religious indoctrination," presumably through the sign-
ing of material with religious content.37
For me, especially as tutored by McConnell, this conclusion
seems to tread dangerously close to an "unconstitutional condi-
tion"-that is, the forced waiver of a constitutional right as
consideration for some valuable governmental benefit.3' Here,
the availability of the valuable benefit of a state-funded inter-
preter making it possible for a deaf child to be "mainstreamed"
in regard to receiving an education, requires the waiver of his
right to attend a religious school. Although such conditions can
be imposed on any citizen, it is obvious that the poor are espe-
cially vulnerable to the blandishments held out by the welfare
state, whose "safety net" may be the only thing between the
recipient and a hard fall.
It is, of course, a rich irony that the Chief Justice has been
generally unsympathetic either to the plight of the poor or to
the more general "unconstitutional condition" analysis, 9 while
Justice Blackmun has, in recent years, proved himself quite
sensitive both to the general needs of the poor and to the po-
tential for abuse of governmental largesse.4 ° In Zobrest,
36. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter dissented on technical
grounds from the Court's reaching the substantive issue.
37. 113 S. Ct. at 2471.
38. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1988); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
39. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Federal Communications
Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
40. Justice Blackmun dissented, for example, in the abortion funding cases, Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) as well as in
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1759.
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though, Blackmun seems sublimely uninterested in the fact
that the Zobrest family paid $7000/year to hire an interpreter
for their son following the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals invalidating Arizona's provision of aid." But what
if another family in the same position as the Zobrests, but
unable to afford the extra $28,000 to send their child to a reli-
gious school, had in effect been compelled to send her to a
public school (or to a non-sectarian private school) in order to
receive the necessary services of a state-funded interpreter?
Why should we complacently accept this as "required" by the
Establishment Clause? I (now) see no good reason to do this. As
should be obvious, I see good reason to be more understanding
of the plight of families like the Zobrests.
I am especially mystified how anyone devoted to any extent
to one or another of the contemporary defenses of "multicultura-
lism" could oppose on principle the kind of legislative discretion
at issue in Zobrest or the other classic parochial school funding
cases. It is a deep irony that at least some of the Christian
supporters of non-public education are vehemently opposed to
"multiculturalism," which, by ostensibly promoting a kind of
relativism, in their opinion attacks the one true view of the
world. 2 Yet surely the strongest arguments likely to persuade
secularists to tolerate (and perhaps even to support) the various
Christian academies and other religious schools that dot the
landscape are precisely those that emphasize the importance of
nurturing a vibrant and, therefore, contentious cultural plural-
ism. This means, almost by definition, that we exhibit a mea-
sure of concern and respect for cultural perspectives that one
not only does not identify with, but even finds abhorrent in
significant aspects.4"
41. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Says Government May Pay for Interpreter in Reli-
gious School, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1993, at 1, 8. One assumes that, as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision, they will be remunerated for their expenditures.
42. See, e.g., the description of Vicki Frost's views in Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-62 (6th Cir. 1987), discussed infra section H.B.
43. No doubt there are limits to the tolerance due truly pernicious subcultures,
especially if, as matter of social fact, they potentially threaten the maintenance of
liberal democracy itself. Fortunately, that is a topic beyond the scope of this particu-
lar essay. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES (1990).
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All of this being said, though, I find myself lamenting the
retreat from public education by groups who increasingly feel
alienated from the culture of the public schools. That I have
been persuaded by McConnell's arguments as to what the Con-
stitution allows (and what a serious commitment to egalitarian-
ism may require, at least as a matter of political theory) is not
the same thing as saying that it is an affirmative social good
that children be educated in homogeneous environments free
from the taint of contact with children who may be quite differ-
ent. Indeed, I have no hesitation in counting it as an overall
social evil that the challenge of coming to terms with our
multicultural reality is increasingly taking on a frankly separat-
ist dimension. 4
To this extent, I disagree with McConnell when he argues
that "[t]he common school movement has run its course and no
longer can establish a coherent position in the face of the con-
flicting demands of a diverse nation."45 For McConnell, the
American public school has in effect become estopped, either
because of constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court
or simply acquiescence to the fragmented nature of American
society, from "teach[ing] any god because it would have to teach
all gods; it cannot teach any culture because it would have to
teach all cultures .... The common school movement now
teaches our children, unintentionally, to be value-less, culture-
less, root-less, and religion-less."46 Thus, he says, "[iut can no
longer achieve its crowning purpose of providing a unifying
moral culture in the face of our many differences."47 For Mc-
Connell, the answer is to adopt educational financing systems
which would maximize the "freedom of choice" of the parents by
providing them with vouchers, even if the likely consequence is
the flourishing of individually homogeneous schools.48
44. See HUGHES, supra note 7 for an eloquent polemic on this point.
45. Michael McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice:
What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say? 1991 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 123,
149.
46. Id. at 148-50.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 126.
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At some point, the nurturance of "pluralism" requires the
toleration of "separatism." This is exemplified most clearly in
our constitutional law by Wisconsin v. Yoder,49 where the state
was required to subordinate its general educational policy of
compulsory education to the interests of a minority community
in maintaining its own distinctive way of life apart from the
surrounding society. In Amy Gutmann's terms, the "family
state," predicated on emphasizing a common membership in an
overarching political community, was subordinated to a "state of
families" in which the primary unit is the particularistic com-
munity and the wider polity more a confederation of these com-
munities than a genuine community in its own right.50
All of this being said, and conceding the importance of nur-
turing pluralism, I think it important that we try, as much as
is reasonably possible, to resist the development of the separat-
ism to which it can too easily lead. The "resistance," it is im-
portant to say, should be based on force of argument rather
than force of law. I hope I have made clear the extent to which
I would rewrite some of our current doctrines interpreting the
Establishment Clause in order to allow more state funding of
non-public, including religiously-based, schools. But one can
also, at the very same time, support strengthening public
schools in ways designed to encourage (even if not to require)
persons from all sorts of backgrounds, and with all sorts of
views, to attend them and to interact with one another.
B. On School Prayer and Similar Matters
How might one go about the task of bringing about what
seems to be the increasingly utopian dream51 outlined in the
last paragraph? To answer this question adequately would obvi-
ously require a book. My goals here are considerably more
modest. I want to address the question of what types of "con-
cessions" (if this is the proper word) I am willing to make in
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 19-41 (1987).
51. As one reader suggested, some persons (including, presumably, the parents who
brought the Mozert litigation discussed infra) might well regard this as a dystopian
nightmare instead.
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order to allow self-consciously religious parents to feel more
comfortable in sending their children to public schools. I am
assuming, of course, that my own sensibility is not unique and
that I can speak to, even if not for, others who share my own
self-definition as a secularist in at least two somewhat different
senses. First, I possess no "religious" beliefs, as conventionally
defined. Though I continue strongly to identify myself as Jew-
ish, this has little, if anything, to do with embracing any theo-
logical propositions myself. Secondly, I reject the propriety of
the states overtly articulating any theological propositions. I
read the Establishment Clause as prohibiting "in God we trust"
from the coinage. I thus remain militantly opposed (as do many
non-secularists) to any endorsement, direct or indirect, of the
United States as a "Christian" (or even "Judeo-Christian")
nation.
It should be no surprise, then, that my initial delight with
Engel v. Vitale,52 the first Supreme Court decision striking
down state-sponsored school prayer, has never entirely dissipat-
ed. Officially composed prayers, even with an opt-out provision
for those who wish not to participate, easily count as a viola-
tion of my version of the Establishment Clause. I was pleased
when a slender majority struck down, in Wallace v. Jaffree,3
an Alabama "moment of silence" law which was passed at the
behest of religious groups and involved teachers overtly inform-
ing their students that one (presumably preferred) use of the
moment of silence would be "prayer." Similarly, I rejoiced last
year when the Court, to many analysts' surprise, struck down
in Lee v. Weisman"' the Rhode Island school district's practice
of inviting members of the clergy to deliver prayers (albeit
"nonsectarian") at the official baccalaureate ceremonies that are
part of graduation from high school. Again, it seemed to me
that the state was in effect trying to extract an "unconstitution-
al condition"-the waiver of one's right not to be subjected to
official state-organized prayer in order to attend the public
baccalaureate ceremonies of graduation week.
52. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
53. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
54. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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On reflection, though, I am reminded of the curse of the
monkey's paw-being granted what (one thinks) one wishes. It
is hard to believe that this triumvirate of cases has in fact
made this a better society overall. Instead, I suspect they have
made their own contribution to the perception of a kulturk-
ampf-a cultural war-between secularism and sectarianism
and, concomitantly, to the further fraying of any remaining
social bonds that might once have linked these elements of
society." Not the least contributor to the fraying is precisely
the treatment of the issue of prayer in the public schools as one
of high legal principle, and subject, therefore, to resolution by
the analytical techniques mastered by lawyers. This seems
increasingly dubious as a picture of social reality, even if one
accepts the perhaps even more dubious portrait of lawyers as
truly skilled in the working out of principled doctrinal argu-
ments.
As Stephen Carter has written in a recent review of Ronald
Dworkin's new book,5" which purports to settle the questions
of abortion and euthanasia by reference to consistent principles,
society sometimes (perhaps often) is far more in need of com-
promise than of rigorous adherence to principles. As Carter
points out, "[clompromises, by their nature, possess the internal
inconsistencies and contradictions that scholars, by their nature,
abhor. Scholars want arguments to make sense; but politicians
know that arguments have to work-which means, in the long
run, that they must form the basis for a stable consensus.""
Therefore, what I offer now is not a refinement of the doctrinal
arguments so ably made by others as a discussion of possible
terms of compromise. That is, what am I willing to offer, by
way of compromise, in order to still some of the cannon- (and
canon-) fire in the kulturkampf?
I begin with the set of issues raised in Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education," in which several fundamentalist
55. See, e.g., JAmEs D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991).
56. Stephen L. Carter, Strife's Dominion, THE NEW YORKER, August 9, 1993, 86
(reviewing RONALD DwORKN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993)).
57. Id. at 92.
58. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). See generally the important article by Nomi
Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination,
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"born-again Christian"59 parents claimed a constitutional right
to have their children exempted from certain reading assign-
ments in the local public schools because these assignments
purportedly encouraged beliefs that ran contrary to the version
of biblical literalism embraced by the parents. Two parents
testified, in the language of the court, that they "objected to
passages that expose their children to other forms of religion
and to the feelings, attitudes and values of other students that
contradict the plaintiffs' religious views without a statement
that the other views are incorrect and that the plaintiffs' views
are the correct one."6 °
To put it mildly, I do not share the world view of these par-
ents. Taken seriously, they represent nothing less than an at-
tack on the very notions of independent analysis and self-reflec-
tion to which I would like to think I have dedicated my own
life."' Moreover, one notes that the readings at issue ostensi-
bly were chosen by Tennessee to carry out the statutory duty of
public schools "to help each student develop positive values and
to improve student conduct as students learn to act in harmony
with their positive values and learn to become good citizens in
their school, community, and society."62 For ease of argument,
let it be stipulated that the readings in fact did these desirable
things. Does this combination of desirable readings and ques-
tionable, perhaps even appalling parental values conclude the
discussion?
To answer this question requires returning to Pierce and its
protection of private education. For all of the emphasis placed
and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). Also essential
for any student of Mozert is STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGRARD (1993).
59. By no means are all "born again Christians" either "fundamentalists" or com-
mitted to the kinds of views articulated by the plaintiffs in this case.
60. 827 F.2d at 1062.
61. In these post-modernist times, it is necessary to note that "independence" and
"self-reflection" are highly problematic notions, for we are always embedded within
the presuppositions of a given culture, and our "self' is substantially a creation of
that culture. One can, therefore, never gain a leverage point of "independence" from
culture per se, nor, obviously, can one engage in out-of-self experiences in order to
reflect in a thoroughly detached way on the object that goes under one's name. All of
this can be conceded, I believe, without giving up all allegiance to the Enlightenment
value of "thinking for oneself" that remains the core of a liberal education.
62. 827 F.2d at 1060 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. 49-6-1007 (Supp. 1968)).
1010 [Vol. 27:989
REFLECTIONS ON RELIGION AND SOCIETY
by the court on the importance of public schools as the molder
of democratic citizens, it readily embraces the legitimacy of
fleeing from the public school and the presumed inculcation of
quite different values. Judge Lively, for the majority in Mozert,
sets out his view of the choices facing the parents:
The parents in the present case want their children to ac-
quire all the skills required to live in modem society. They
also want to have them excused from exposure to some
ideas they find offensive. Tennessee offers two options to
accommodate this latter desire. The plaintiff parents can
either send their children to church schools or private
schools, as many of them have done, or teach them at home.
Tennessee law prohibits any state interference in the educa-
tion process of church schools.'
So the choice is (deceptively) clear: One can attend the public
schools on one's terms, or place one's children in church or
home schools, which can apparently be operated entirely on the
parents' (or a religious school's) terms. Are we stuck with these
two alternatives?
I think not, precisely because Pierce, at least as interpreted
by the court and substantiated by Tennessee law, seems sub-
limely indifferent to the universal inculcation of "positive" val-
ues. That is, once the state tolerates, either out of constitution-
al necessity or political ideology, what might be termed counter-
hegemonic schools, then it seems hard, if not impossible, for the
very same state to say that it has a "compelling state interest"
justifying the burden placed on religious students by disallow-
ing them from opting out of certain aspects of the public school
curriculum. If the interest is truly "compelling," then one would
think that the state would act aggressively to make sure that
no child is denied its enjoyment.
63. Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). Judge Lively quotes Tennessee Code Annotated §
49-50-801(b) (Supp. 1968): 'The state board of education and local boards of education
are prohibited from regulating the selection of faculty or textbooks or the establish-
ment of a curriculum in church-related schools." If this statute means what it ap-
pears to say on the surface, then the state does indeed seem to have ceded sover-
eignty to the parents (or at least to the administrators of a church school). See supra
note 22.
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However, once the state allows parents to withdraw their
children entirely from the public schools and to inculcate views
and values that might be quite antagonistic to the interests of
the liberal democratic state, then why not allow these parents
to enjoy the public schools on at least some of their own terms,
including the opting out from offensive curricular requirements?
There is an easy answer to this question which involves the
potentially high administrative costs attached to tolerating the
opting out and, for example, preparing tests on reading materi-
al different from that read by most of the students. I do not in
the least deny the reality of these and other costs that un-
doubtedly make the already hard work of the public school
teacher more burdensome. I do offer two observations, though.
First, there is no indication in the Mozert opinion of precisely
what these costs, as a practical matter, would be. Secondly,
there is a whole body of constitutional law, most of it admitted-
ly from the Warren Court days, denigrating administrative ease
and low costs as counterweights to "fundamental" constitutional
interests. It seems hard to gainsay, for example, that protection
of religious free exercise is at least equal in fundamentality as
a constitutional value to the "right to travel" of indigents so
vigorously protected by the majority in Shapiro v. Thompson
against Connecticut's attempt to impose a one-year residency
requirement, justified by reference to administrative and fiscal
convenience, prior to the receipt of welfare.6
Moreover, liberals who often are properly quick to label as an
"unconstitutional condition" the state's attempts to "buy up"
important constitutional rights through the provision of public
assistance, seem all too acquiescent here. 61 Surely, at least if
one is even modestly egalitarian, Pierce cannot stand for the
proposition that the state can exact any requirement it wishes
from those who attend publicly financed schools so long as in-
dividuals with enough money or ideological zeal are free to
withdraw and attend non-public schools.
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. See Justice Douglas's dissent in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 327 (1971)
("[Tihe central question is whether the government by force of its largesse has the
power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution.").
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Whatever else might be said about these parents, they were
willing to reject the option of separatism that the Constitution,
and the laws of Tennessee, granted them. To this extent, they
should be praised rather than discouraged and made to feel
ever more marginal. For better or worse, one cannot compel
these students to attend public and multi-cultural schools; that
is the meaning of Pierce. By 'definition, this means that they
must be lured, and this requires offering them at least some of
what it will take to keep them within the public schools. As a
practical matter, only attending public (or what used to be
called "common") schools will offer the possibility of contact
being made with persons significantly different from themsel-
ves. Although one certainly should not over-estimate the impor-
tance of such contact-Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Mos-
lems, after all, used to live next door to one another in
Bosnia-it seems to me better than the alternative of ever-more
separatism.
Candor compels me to state that I am considerably less will-
ing to compromise in terms of the curriculum foisted on non-
religious students. That is, I am certainly disinclined, as a
matter of politics, to support the entry into the general curricu-
lum of "creation science." That is easy (at least for me). What is
harder is deciding whether the Constitution is best interpreted
as foreclosing a state legislature or local school board from
requiring that "creation science" be taught as an alternative
account of the origins of life to evolution.66 I personally doubt
that exposure to "creation science" arguments is all that impor-
tant, and it is even possible that a gifted teacher could use the
conflict between such accounts and those of more traditional
evolutionary biology to teach students, including religious stu-
dents, something about the way scientific arguments are actual-
ly conducted in terms of evidence, hypotheses, the handling of
anomalous data, etc.
I suspect that the conflict, like so much legal strife, is of
primarily symbolic importance. It has to do precisely with the
66. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana law
that required the teaching of "creation science" together with evolution, because pas-
sage of the law was motivated by the illegitimate purpose of aiding religion).
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determination of religious parents that the public school system
pay them some formal respect by acknowledging the "thinka-
bility" of some of their cherished views about the creation of
life. To say that it is primarily a symbolic issue is not meant to
denigrate it; after all, as Justice Holmes once pointed out, "[wie
live by symbols.""7  No one who has drunk from the
(post)modern well of semiotics can be blind to the importance of
symbolism. It is in the very nature of a kulturkampf that the
issues of maximum strife will have far less to do with the divi-
sion of material resources-the basic issue of class war-
fare-than with the valence to be placed on certain cherished
myths and symbols by which the cultural combatants give mea-
ning to their otherwise literally meaningless lives. No less than
the Godfather do most human beings yearn for "respect," and
woe to the society that systematically denies respect to any
large (and mobilizable) subset of its population.
The universal desire for respect, incidentally, suggests why it
is important that offers of compromise be two-way, including
the acceptance by the "religious right" of a substantially more
secular, culturally-pluralistic, school system than they might
otherwise prefer. There is certainly reason for secularists to
believe that they are fundamentally disrespected by many of
the so-called "new religious right." As with tangos, it takes two
to engage in a kulturkampf. If there is no alternative to a kult-
urkampf, then I have no hesitation in lining up with the oppo-
nents of religious orthodoxy. The question, though, is whether
there is indeed an alternative to such a grim prospect.
All of these issues come together with regard to prayer in the
public schools. To the extent that religious students continue to
attend public schools, school prayer will undoubtedly continue
to be a minefield. What am I willing to offer here? From one
perspective, undoubtedly, the answer is not much. I still un-
equivocally applaud both Engel and Lee; the state has no busi-
ness either composing or arranging for the offering of prayers
in public events. On the other hand, I find myself much less
enamored of Wallace, even conceding that the purpose of the
Alabama legislators, who passed the statute was to sneak
67. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 270 (1920).
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prayer, at least somewhat, back into the schoolroom and that
the teacher would state the magic word in calling the class to
silence. Is it worth it, even from a secularist perspective, to pro-
hibit such a law if the cost-and one must, of course, see this
as a cost and not as a benefit-is to alienate yet more religious
parents (and possibly their children) from the public schools
and, in some cases, to drive them from the public schools into
one or another religious "academy?"
My answer, as one can readily gather, is no. The loss of such
students, should it in fact be occurring, deprives the public
school of an important "different voice" that enhances the diver-
sity so important to education. If one can keep some students
simply by allowing a moment of silence, and allowing a teacher
to say that at least some students might use this moment for
prayer while others contemplate the meaning of life, last night's
date, or whatever, it is a cheap price to pay. To insist on stam-
ping out such moments in the name of the "wall of separation"
is to fall victim to an ideological zeal that is little better, I am
now convinced, than the zealotry exhibited by those who would
wish to absorb the state as an ally in endorsing and/or enforc-
ing a specific theological program. It is, therefore, my hope that
Wallace, if not flatly overruled, will in the future be restricted
to its specific facts. State-imposed moments of silence and con-
templation, unaccompanied by state-composed prayers or en-
treaties from the teacher to engage in prayer, ought not to be
viewed as presenting threats to the values underlying the Es-
tablishment Clause.
I want to conclude this section by trying to answer a series
of questions asked by Professor McConnell in a recent letter.
They both capture the kinds of controversies increasingly being
litigated and, more importantly, present just the kinds of ques-
tions that anyone concerned with the practice (and not simply
the theory) of multiculturalism must grapple with. The chal-
lenge offered by McConnell was as follows:
[Wihat would you do if the graduating class is allowed to
vote on whom to invite to give the graduation address, and
the class votes for a person whose principal appeal is reli-
gious (the local bishop, perhaps-or a religious writer)?
Would you allow a separate, voluntary baccalaureate ser-
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vice, organized by the school (or, better yet, a committee of
the student government)? Would it be permissible for the
student government to allow a representative sampling of
the viewpoints in the class each to speak for five minutes
at the graduation ceremony-and include an evangelical
type? And what about non-school settings? Presumably, for
the President to include prayers at his inauguration is per-
missible on the ground that it is done in his "private" ca-
pacity; presumably the same would be true of a joint swear-
ing-in of a group of congressmen; why isn't the same princi-
ple applicable to graduating seniors from high school?"
Would I allow the graduating class to pick the speaker, even
if the basis of the selection is presumably the (likely) religious
content of the address? I distinguish this, incidentally, from a
class vote to have a student-led prayer, which I would strike
down in an instant.69"' One might want to know the back-
ground that provides a "baseline" for consideration. If students
traditionally chose the speaker, and if, over many years, speak-
ers had been drawn from a variety of places on the intellectual
spectrum, and if speakers had taken advantage of the opportu-
nity offered them to make controversial speeches challenging
conventional views (conditions that I would be absolutely aston-
ished to find met in more than a handful of high schools), then
I would be inclined to describe as "censorship" the refusal by a
school to honor a class's choice to hear, as in McConnell's exam-
ple, the local bishop and the likely invocation of religious
themes.
I would analogize the example to the situation presented
before the Supreme Court this past Term in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,7" where a unani-
mous Court struck down the refusal of a New York school
board to grant permission to Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical
church in the local community, to "show a six-part film series
containing lectures" on the family and arguing the necessity of
68. Letter from Michael W. McConnell to Sanford Levinson (July 7, 1993).
69. Cf Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) (holding student-initiated prayer acceptable). I would,
of course, reverse the Fifth Circuit.
70. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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"returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an
early state."1 The Board was applying its rule prohibiting the
use of public school facilities, even after school hours, for "reli-
gious purposes," even though other rules allowed access to a
multitude of nonreligious groups. 2 The Court properly' found
this content-based distinction in violation of the First
Amendment.
An obvious distinction is that the Lamb's Chapel program is
not formally sponsored or otherwise endorsed by the school
board, whereas *the graduation ceremony, even if not compulso-
ry, is a central public ritual, and it would be unfortunate in-
deed if a member of the non-hegemonic minority was reluctant
to attend such an important occasion because of the anticipato-
ry discomfort produced by the prospect of a religiously-oriented
speech. But, of course, the discomfort could well be produced by
inviting the local member of Congress or anyone else identified
with any controversial stance on public issues. 3 If, however,
as I suspect is almost certainly going to be the case, student
selection of the speaker is a brand-new option, adopted at least
in part to evade the strictures of Weisman and other similar
decisions, then I have little hesitancy in striking down
McConnell's first example.
Would I permit a separate, voluntary baccalaureate service,
organized by the school (or, better yet, a committee of the
student government) at which prayer(s) would be offered? No to
the school-organized service. After all, the "official" baccalaure-
ate service is "voluntary," and that properly made no difference
to the Weisman majority. The school system should not be in
the business of organizing "separate-but-equal" services,
regardless of the basis of the separation. I am inclined to give
the same answer for the service organized by the student
government.
71. Id. at 2149.
72. Id. at 2148.
73. Consider, for example, the demonstrations mounted this past June at Harvard
in protest of the selection of General Colin Powell, who opposed proposals by Presi-
dent Clinton to integrate gays and lesbians fully into the armed forces, as the gradu-
ation speaker there.
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Far different is a separate ceremony organized by a group of
students, including, for example, the president of the student
council and the captain of the football team, and held "off-cam-
pus," perhaps at a local church. I can see no argument for
enjoining students from announcing their desire to offer thanks
to God upon completion of their high school careers and invit-
ing their classmates to join them. What if the "supplementary"
ceremony in fact became the principal one, so that most of the
students and parents showed up at the local church and rela-
tively few bothered to come to the high school auditorium? (I
assume, for ease of argument, that the two services are not
scheduled at the same time.) I would regard this as most unfor-
tunate, but again I cannot imagine any reading of the First
Amendment that would bar students and parents from organiz-
ing a religious service to which the public is invited. Only if the
organizing committee included school officials might there be a
genuine dilemma, though even here one should be wary of
forcing public employees to waive their own rights of free ex-
pression as a condition of accepting public employment.
Could the student government allow a representative sam-
pling of the viewpoints in the class to speak for five minutes
each at the graduation ceremony, and include an evangelical
type? This strikes me as an easy case: The answer is yes, again
assuming that there is no ground for viewing this simply as a
pretext to evade Weisman. It becomes especially easy if the
"representative sampling" includes students expressing non-
religious views likely to get under the skin of many of those in
attendance, such as endorsements of gay and lesbian rights,
attacks on welfare recipients, support (or denunciation) of capi-
tal punishment, and the like. Weisman properly bars the state
from asking students to "join in" a prayer, even if they have
the option of refusing the invitation. Hearing an evangelical
student, one among many other students, witness his or her
faith in Jesus, is simply not the same thing.
Indeed, the evangelical student need not necessarily be "bal-
anced" with non-religious counterparts. If, for example, the
valedictorian is evangelical and wishes to begin her speech with
thanks to God, then that is acceptable. She earned her right to
speak on grounds wholly separate from her religious identity,
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and, generally speaking, the state ought not be able to extract
a "bleaching out"74 of her religious identity as a condition for
enjoying what all valedictorians have enjoyed before her-the
right to speak to her classmates and parents. Things get far
trickier, of course, if, as is common, valedictory speeches are in
effect subject to censorship via submission to the principal for
review. However, I confess that I find the idea of review itself
to be far more constitutionally suspect than the prospect of the
speaker "slipping in" some prayer. The valedictorian should
have the same freedom as the President of the United States to
include religious references in her speech.75
III. CONCLUSION: TOwARD SYNTHESIS?
I have tried in this essay to offer reflections on some implica-
tions of the reality of religious multiculturalism within America.
I have also tried, quite self-consciously, to present myself as a
wonderfully tolerant person who genuinely wishes to reach out
to persons of decidedly different sensibility from my own. Yet
candor requires me to admit that one reason I would prefer the
children at issue in Mozert to attend the public schools is pre-
cisely to increase the likelihood that they might be lured away
from the views-some of them only foolish, others, alas, quite
pernicious-of their parents. Perhaps they will meet and begin
talking with, and learning from, more secular students.
Here we see the underside of terms like "tolerance," for, gen-
erally speaking, one who self-consciously "tolerates" opposing
views or ways of life is unlikely to offer them "equal concern
and respect." Instead, the tolerator only holds back from exer-
cising certain kinds of force that would make the lives of the
tolerated even worse. I do not mean to denigrate "toleration."
There can be no doubt that the move from a society in which
74. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Con-
struction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1577, 1578, 1601 (1993).
75. This being said, I must add a strong desire that presidents in fact choose to
omit opening and closing benedictions at inaugurations. These should come, I believe,
under the strictures announced in Weisman, though I scarcely expect any court to
enjoin the President from inviting ministers, priests, and rabbis (and, in the near
future, Islamic and Buddhist prelates), to take part in inaugural rituals.
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one is actively suppressed to one in which one is tolerated is an
important gain, and much of the world would be better off if
toleration were more widespread. Still, no one should confuse
this full and complete acceptance. It is this difference that is at
the heart, I believe, of the contemporary debate about the pub-
lic stance regarding gays and lesbians. Many straight Ameri-
cans are far more willing to "tolerate" gays and lesbians than
to acknowledge that there is really nothing at all objectionable
about gay and lesbian behavior. Similar tensions are present
when sectarians are asked to grant full legitimacy to secular
perspectives and, of course, vice versa.
In any event, I find myself far more in a "tolerationist" than
a genuinely "accepting" posture vis-a-vis persons like Vicki
Frost. Thus I confess my hope that her children, by attending
public schools, will in fact meet and begin talking with (and
learning from) more secular students. My anger at the Hawkins
County School Board is derived as much from their driving the
children away, and thus, from my perspective, contributing,
albeit indirectly, to the reinforcement of their parents' world-
view, as it is from the Board's exhibiting antagonism to the
worldview itself. To push these students from the public
schools, by refusing to make the kinds of concessions their
parents demanded-which, after all, went only to their educa-
tion and not to the materials assigned all of the other
children-will assure that they will in fact be educated within
institutions that are, from my perspective at least, far more
limiting and, indeed, "totalitarian" than anything likely to be
found within a decent public school. My desire to "lure" reli-
gious parents back to the public schools thus has at least a
trace of the spider's web about it.
I recognize, of course, that in a genuinely religiously multi-
cultural school some secular students will be led to accept the
students' religious understanding. Isn't this what education is
all about-to present alternative views of the world and thus
potentially transform the lives of individuals who had not here-
tofore dreamt of these possibilities? But, as already indicated, I
am, perhaps optimistically, assuming that the transformation is
far more likely to run from the religious to the secular than
vice versa, and I cannot honestly say I know what I would be
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arguing if I were persuaded that the likelihood, as a practical
matter, ran in the opposite direction.
Do the last several paragraphs undercut the professed aim of
this essay and thus deny the possibility of a synthesis of the
initial thesis and antithesis presented at the beginning? Or, to
adopt a question posed by James Boyd White,"6 do I reveal
myself to be fundamentally uninterested in truly encountering
the Others who do not share my own secular sensibility? And if
that is the case, then why should they trust me truly to adjudi-
cate their claims, anymore than I would be inclined to trust one
of them to adjudicate my own?
My professed aim is to call upon fellow secularists to think of
possible grounds of compromise with religious sectarians, espe-
cially in regard to the extraordinarily complex issue of educa-
tion. I would like to think that is my real aim as well. But it is
altogether possible that what this essay ultimately reveals is
the difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of finding a common
ground on which secularists and the religiously orthodox can
walk together. After all, as the prophet Amos asked more than
two millennia ago, "Do two people travel together unless they
have agreed to do so?"" Perhaps I simply have not taken suf-
ficient account of, and I may even illustrate, the deep chasm
separating these two parts of the American social community.
But we will not know this for a fact unless we at least make
good faith attempts to understand the positions of the combat-
ants in America's kulturkampf and to see if there are indeed
ways to prevent the conflicts from becoming ever more deadly
to the hope of achieving some kind of unum among the pluribus
of American society.
76. "I think it less important," he wrote in a very thoughtful letter commenting on
an earlier draft, "how a particular judge or scholar comes out than who he manages
to make himself--and his audience, and the law-in the way in which he thinks and
talks about the case." Letter from White, to Levinson (October 13, 1993) (on file with
the author of this article). I am not at all sure that this conclusion, rewritten as a
result of White's letter, fully meets his point, but I am grateful to him for pushing
me to think more deeply about what I hope to do (and to reveal) by writing this
article.
77. Amos 3:3 (New Jerusalem 1985). Of course, much of the major political theory
of our time is structured by the obvious reality that society has become radically
pluralistic, which by definition means substantial disagreement about basic issues.
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